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EQUAL PROTECTION REVIEW OF STATE STATUTES
RESTRICTING ALIEN EMPLOYMENT
The early common law of the United States extended a friendly
reception to the alien, and as long as the demand for human resources
greatly exceeded the native supply, there were no general restrictions
placed on aliens with respect to employment. As America changed
from an agrarian to an urbanized industrial society, however, native
fear of economic competition induced a change in the treatment
accorded aliens.' In an attempt to protect their citizens from alien
competition, states enacted legislation limiting employment oppor-
tunities available to non-citizens. Lacking an effective voice at the
polls, 2 aliens turned to the courts, where some limited protection
against discriminatory legislation was found in the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, a permissive standard
of judicial review enabled the states to continue discriminatory regula-
tion of alien employment.
The more recent adoption of a strict standard of judicial review,
along with the recognition of alienage as a suspect classification under
the Fourteenth Amendment, has raised some -serious questions con-
cerning the constitutional validity of a number of discriminatory em-
ployment statutes. This Note will examine the judicial development of
this standard and consider the implications of this development on the
future validity of state legislation which attempts to deny public emp-
loyment to aliens.
PERMISSIVE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The permissive standard of judicial review formerly applied under
the Equal Protection Clause with regard to alien employment merely
1. State alien restrictions and the political situation occasioning their adoption are
discussed in M. KONviTz, THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW 117-211 (1946).
For a commentary on some of the forces involved in producing restrictive statutes such
as are found in the Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1889), see Comment,
Equal Protection and Supremacy Clause Limitations on State Legislation Restricting Aliens, 1970
UTAH L. REv. 136 n.4.
2. During the nineteenth century, the laws of at least 22 states and territories allowed
aliens the right to vote. By 1928, laws were passed in every state disenfranchising aliens.
See M. KONVITE, supra note I, at 1.
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required that the statutory classification be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.3 Under such a standard, constitutional protec-
tion often proved illusory, since whenever the purpose of a
classification was challenged on equal protection grounds, the courts
attributed to the challenged classification either that purpose thought
to be most probable4 or any reasonably conceivable purpose which
would support the constitutionality of the classification.5 Moreover,
whether a classification was irrational, arbitrary, or capricious in a
constitutional sense was, in the end, a relative matter. Thus, a state law
was surrounded with a presumption of validity, rebuttable only by a
showing that there could be no rational relation between the restriction
and any reasonable state interest.
6
Although it has long been recognized that aliens are entitled to
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment,7 the early adherence of
the Supreme Court to a permissive standard of review enabled the
states to limit or deny employment to aliens. The justification for such
discriminatory state action was founded upon two general theories: the
"proprietary interest rationale" and the "police power rationale. '
3. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-27 (1961); Morey v. Doud, 354
U.S. 457, 465 (1957); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955); Lindsley
v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
4. See, e.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920).
5. See, e.g., Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); Developments in the Law: Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1076-78 (1969).
6. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961):
State legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power
despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.
Therefore, legislation which differentiated between two classes was unconstitutional only
if irrational, arbitrary, or capricious. E.g., Bayside Fish Flour Co. v. Gentry, 297 U.S. 422,
429 (1936); Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Arkansas R.R. Comm'n, 261 U.S. 379, 384
(1923). See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 425-26 and cases cited therein; Cox,
Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv.
91, 95 n.28 (1966).
7. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886):
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the protec-
tion of citizens.... These provisions are universal in their application, to all
persons Within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of
race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge
of the protection of equal laws.
8. One commentator has further analyzed these two general theories as follows:
(1) The state's proprietary interest over the subject matter of the occupation,
such as the taking of fish or game;
(2) The state's proprietary interest over the position itself, as in employment in
government or on public works;
(3) The state's police power, ujider which it may
(a) deny aliens employment in. enterprises (such as the sale of intoxicating
Cornell International Law Journal
Under the proprietary interest rationale, a state could favor its citizens
over aliens in the distribution of public property, since a state held its
property and resources in trust for its citizens as owners. 9 It followed,
then, that the opportunity to be employed in public enterprises was a
privilege which the state could grant or withdraw as it pleased.10 By
virtue of its police power, a state could legitimately deny employment
to aliens in those enterprises thought to be of a harmful or anti-social
nature and it could establish reasonable classifications in the interests of
public health, safety, morals, or welfare." Thus, the proprietary in-
liquor or the operation of a pool room)judged to be of such a dangerous
or anti-social nature that the state could prohibit them altogether, or
(b) make reasonable classifications in the interest of the public health, safety,
morals and welfare.
Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, 57 COLuM. L REv. 1012, 1014
(1957).
9. The Supreme Court has relied upon the proprietary interest rationale to uphold
statutes that limit the right of non-citizens to engage in exploitation of a state's natural
resources so as to preserve common property for citizens. E.g., Patsone v. Pennsylvania,
232 U.S. 138 (1914); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
10. The "special public interest doctrine," one aspect of the proprietary interest
rationale, justified state statutes that treated citizens and non-citizens differently on the
ground that such laws were necessary to protect special interests of the state or its
citizens. E.g., Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); Heim v. McCall, 239
U.S. 175 (1915); Rok v. Legg, 27 F. Supp. 243 (S.D. Cal. 1939); Lelande v. Lowery, 26
Cal. 2d 224, 157 P.2d 639 (1945); Lee v. City of Lynn, 223 Mass. 109, 111 N.E. 700
(1916); People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427 (1915), affd, 239 U.S. 195 (1915).
In Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1915), the Supreme Court, in striking down an
Arizona statute restricting the employment of aliens, emphasized that:
[t]he discrimination defined by the act does not pertain to the regulation or
distribution of the public domain, or of the common property or resources of
the.people of the State, the enjoyment of which may be limited to its citizens as
against both aliens and the citizens of other States.
In Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915), the Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment in People v. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 108 N.E. 427 (1915), upholding a New York
statute prohibiting employment of aliens on public works projects. The opinion of the
New York Court of Appeals contained Mr. justice Cardozo's well-known observation:
To disqualify aliens is discrimination indeed, but not arbitrary discrimination,
for the principle of exclusion is the restriction of the resources of the state to the
advancement and profit of the members of the state. Ungenerous and unwise
such discrimination may be. It is not for that reason unlawful ...
The state in determining what use shall be made of its own moneys, may
legitimately consult the welfare of its own citizens rather than that of aliens.
Whatever is a privilege rather than a right, may be made dependent upon
citizenship. In its war against poverty, the state is not required to dedicate its
own resources to citizens and aliens alike. .. .
214 N.Y. at 161, 164, 108 N.E. at 429, 430.
11. E.g., Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); Anton v. Van Winkle,
297 F. 340 (D.C. Ore. 1924); State ex rel. Balli v. Carrel, 99 Ohio St. 285, 124 N.E. 129
(1919) (operating pool room); Asakura v. Seattle, 122 Wash. 81, 210 P. 30 (1922), rev'd,
265 U.S. 332 (1924) (acting as pawnbrokers, rev'd, alien's right to engage in trade
guaranteed by treaty with Japan); Morin v. Nunan, 91 N.J.L 506, 103 A. 378 (Sup. Ct.
[Vol. 8:9§2
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terest and police power rationales formed the bases of a comprehensive
discriminatory scheme which effectively eliminated aliens from many
forms of private and public employment.
A. THE PROPRIETARY RATIONALE
Even though the Supreme Court had clearly established by 1915 that
it was unconstitutional to bar aliens as a class froin the general business
of the community, 12 the exclusion of aliens from public employment
continued to be sustained. The state w.as viewed as having the same
rights as a private employer,13 and., therefore, was unhampered in this
respect by the Fourteenth Amendment.1 4 Since public employment was
theoretically a privilege which the state could grant or deny as it saw fit,
the state had the power to discriminate against aliens for any legitimate
state interest, including protection of its labor market.'
5
However, in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission,' 6 the Supreme
1918); Gizzarelli v. Presbrey, 44 R.I. 333, 117 A. 359 (1922); contra, Magnani v. Harnett,
257 App. Div. 487, 14 N.Y.S.2d 107 (3d Dep't 1939), affd without opinion, 282 N.Y. 619,
25 N.E.2d 395, cert. denied, 310 U.S. 642 (1940) (serving as chauffeurs).
See State v. Stevens, 78 N.H. 268, 99 A. 723 (1916) (selling lightning rods); In re
Parrott, 1 F. 481 (C.C. Cal. 1880) (overthrowing restriction on being employed by
corporations); State v. Travelers Ins. Co., 70 Conn. 590, 40 A. 465 (1898) (dictum)
(holding stock in, or forming corporations).
12. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
13. The rights of a Private employer to maintain a policy of excluding resident aliens
from employment has been unsuccessfully challenged as being a violation of the prohibi-
tion against discrimination on the basis of national origin contained in section 703(a) of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970). Espinoza v.
Farah Mfg. Co., 462 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 86 (1973). See Note, Civil
Rights-Employment-National Origin Discrimination and Aliens, 51 TEXAs L. REv. 128
(1972).
14. E.g., Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903).
See Comment, Equal Protection and Supremacy Clause Limitations on State Legislation Restrict-
ing Aliens, supra note 1, at 141 n.25; Note, Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to
Work, supra note 8, at 1017 n.31; Note, The Right to Work for the State, 16 COLM. L. REv.
99 (1916); Note, National Power to Control State Discrimination Against Foreign Goods and
Persons: A Study in Federalism, 12 STAN. L. Rxv. 355 (1960). See generally, M. KONVITZ,
supra note 1.
15. Prior to the decisions of the New York Court of Appeals in Heim v. McCall, 214
N.Y. 629 (memorandum decision), affd, 239 U.S. 175 (1915), and People v. Crane, 214
N.Y. 154, affd, 239 U.S. 195 (1915), several state courts had voided statutes discriminat-
in against aliens in public employment. These two cases, which marked the reversal of
this trend, were base upon dictum in Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207 (1903). In holding a
Kansas eight-hour law for public works employment to be unconstitutional, the Atkin
court stated, that since nobody was entitled to work for the state, it was the state's
prerogative to establish conditions upon which it would permit public work. 119 U.S. at
222-23. Although the decision is correct on its facts, the dictum has been misapplied. See
Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right To Work, supra note 8, at 1014-17 & n.29;
Note, National Power to Control State Discrimination Against Foreign Goods and Persons, supra
note 14, at 367.
16. 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
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Court cast considerable doubt on the continued validity of the pro-
prietary interest rationale. In that case, a California statute, purportedly
enacted as a conservation measure, barred the issuance of commercial
fishing licenses to persons ineligible for citizenship. The law effectively
barred resident aliens of Japanese ancestry from procuring licenses, as
it was undoubtedly designed to do. The Court concluded that the
statute unconstitutionally denied equal protection of the law to
Japanese aliens and could not be sustained as reasonably related to the
state's legitimate interest in conserving public fishing.
The extent of the protection granted to the alien under Takahashi is
not entirely clear. The Supreme Court stated that the Equal Protection
Clause extended to privileges, 17 and, therefore, it could be argued that
it reaches employment itself. In addition, the Court confined the state's
power to make classifications based solely on alienage to "narrow
limits,"'" prescient of the suspect classification status later developed by
the Supreme Court.' 9 However, this broad interpretation of the Su-
preme Court's construction of the Fourteenth Amendment2 ° is arguably
defective in two respects. First, Takahashi was decided in the context of
discrimination which was clearly aimed at the Japanese, who were
ineligible for citizenship. A state statute that classifies aliens on the basis
of country of origin is more likely to be discriminating on the basis of
race rather than citizenship. Thus, the Takahashi decision may actually
have been premised on racial classification and not on alienage as a
suspect class. 2' Second, the Court's concern with the proprietary in-
terest rationale reached only the state's interest in its common prop-
erty. It was held that any proprietary interest of the state as trustee-
owner of the fish was insufficient to justify the exclusion of aliens from
commercial fishing.22 Thus, while striking a severe blow to the validity
17. Id. at 420.
18. Id.
19. Alienage has been referred to as a suspect basis of classification as a result of three
cases: Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v. California, 332
U.S. 633 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Developments in the
Law: Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 1082. See Note, State Discrimination Against Mexican
Aliens, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1091, 1102 (1970); Note, Protection of Alien Rights Under the
Fourteenth Amendment, 1971 DuKE L.J. 583, 589.
20. The Court did eventually settle on this broad interpretation of Takahashi. See notes
38-40 infra, and accompanying text.
21. This is the position taken by Mr. Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion to
Sugarman v. Dougall and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 634, 651-57 (1973).
22. 334 U.S. at 421:
To whatever extent the fish ... may be "capable of ownership" by California, we
think that "ownership" is inadequate to justify California in excluding any or all
aliens who are lawful residents of the State from making a living by fishing in
the ocean off its shores while permitting all others to do so.
[Vol. 8: 92
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of the proprietary interest rationale by rejecting the state's interest in
common property, Takahashi did not conclusively determine the valid-
ity of state control over the activity itself 23-public employment.
B. THE POLICE POWER RATIONALE
The state's police power has been the more comprehensive of the
two discriminatory rationales. However, despite the traditional pre-
sumption in favor of constitutionality where legislation purported to be
a valid exercise of police power,2 4 it has long been recognized that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the alien against laws valid on their
face, but discriminatory in their application.2 5 Expanding upon this
principle, the Supreme Court in Truax v. Raich,26 held that a state's
interest in promoting the health, safety, morals and welfare of its
citizens would not justify denying aliens the right to work in the
"common occupations of the community. '27 Although not reaching the
issue of the state's police power to regulate harmful, vicious and
anti-social occupations, Truax established the groundwork for later
decisions which brought within the category of "common occupations"
many occupations previously subject to discriminatory regulation on
the basis of state police power.
28
23. But see id. at 430 (Reed, J., dissenting).
24. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
25. In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), a purported fire prevention
ordinance required the licensing of laundries constructed of wood. The officials adminis-
tering the regulation passed on approximately 280 applications; the 200 applications by
Chinese aliens were all denied. The Court held at 373-74:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal
hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal
justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
26. 239 U.S. 33 (1915). In Truax the plaintiff, a native of Austria and an inhabitant of
Arizona, was discharged from employment under a state statute requiring that any
employer of more than five workers must employ not less than eighty per cent United
States citizens. The Court held that:
[Tihe power of the State to make reasonable classifications in legislating to
promote the health, safety, morals and welfare of those within its jurisdiction ...
does not go so far as to make it possible for the State to deny to lawful
inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the ordinary means of earning a
livelihood. It requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in
the common occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal
freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the [Fourteenth] Amend-
inent to secure.
Id. at 41 (citations omitted).
27. Id at 41.
28. E.g., State v. Ellis, 181 Ore. 615, 184 P.2d 860 (1947) (barber); see also Wormsen v.
Moss, 177 Misc. 19, 29 N.Y.S.2d 798 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (massage parlor operator).
1974]
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II
STRICT JUDICIAL REVIEW
The degree of Fourteenth Amendment protection extended to the
alien under Takahashi was unclear from the outset. However, that
decision received extensive interpretation in Purdy & Fitzpatrick v.
State,29 in which the California Supreme Court invalidated a state
statute30 prohibiting the employment of aliens on public works pro-
jects. The statute was vulnerable both as an interference with the
congressional scheme for immigration and naturalization3 ' and as a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In deciding the equal protec-
tion issue, the court summarized the development of the law in this
area and reached two general conclusions concerning Takahashi. First,
the court construed Takahashi as formulating a requirement of strict
judicial review of statutes which discriminate against aliens as a class.
32
This more intensive standard of review, first explicitly articulated by
the United States Supreme Court in Shapiro v. Thompson,3" is invoked
where a classification either affects the exercise of a fundamental right
or is based upon suspect criteria. Not only must the classification
reasonably relate to the purposes of the law,34 but the state must bear
the burden of establishing that the classification constitutes a necessary
29. 71 Cal. 2d 566, 456 P.2d 645, 79 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1969).
30. The statute provided:
No contractor or subcontractor or agent or representative thereof shall know-
ingly employ or cause or allow to be employed on public work any alien, except
in cases of extraordinary emergency caused by fire, flood, or danger to life or
property, or except on work upon public military or naval defenses or works in
time of war.
Id. at 568 n.1, 456 P.2d at 647 n.1, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 79 n.1.
31. Congress possesses the exclusive right to regulate immigration and naturalization.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
Restrictions on alien employment may indirectly exclude aliens and thus encroach
upon the exclusive federal power over immigration. Thus, in its alternative holding in
Trzux, the Court stated:
The authority to control immigration-to admit or exclude aliens-is vested
solely .in the Federal Government.. . . The assertion of an authority to deny to
aliens the opportunity of earning a livelihood when lawfully admitted to the
State would be tantamount to the assertion of the right to deny them entrance
and abode, for in ordinary cases they cannot live where they cannot work.
239 U.S. at 42 (citation omitted).
32. Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 579, 456 P.2d 645, 654, 79 Cal.
Rptr. 77, 86 (1969).
33. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). Legal commentators have conceptualized general notions as
to when active scrutiny of a classification is applicable and under what standards. See
Note, Protection of Alien Rights Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1971 DuKE L.J. 583, 585
n.16.
34. For the formulation of "reasonable relation" see F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
[Vol. 8: 92
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means35 of promoting a compelling state interest. 36 Although statutes
based on suspect classifications are not absolutely prohibited, the courts
will vigorously scrutinize them. As applied to the state law in question,
the California court concluded that the promotion and establishment
of acceptable wages and working conditions in the contract construc-
tion industry ahd the disbursement of common property belonging to
the state did constitute legitimate interests within the state's power. Yet,
when subjected to stringent equal protection analysis, the classification
based on alienage was not rationally related to that goal.
The second conclusion reached by the court in Purdy was that the
Takahashi decision, which had explicitly rejected the state's asserted
proprietary interest in its fish, cast considerable doubt upon the legiti-
macy of the proprietary interest rationale in all contexts, including the
area of public employment.
Purdy's recognition of alienage as a suspect classification requiring
strict judicial review presaged a new level of protection for the alien.
The effect of this California decision, however, was not 'clear. The
inclusion of an additional ground for the decision-interference with
federal power over immigration-suggests that the court may have had
less confidence in the suspect classification rationale than one might
infer from a literal reading of the equal protection analysis. Moreover,
the justifications alleged by the state would have beeft questionable
even under the permissive standard of review.
37
The suspect nature of the alienage classification was conclusively
decided two years later by the United States Supreme Court in Graham
v. Richardson.3 8 Interpreting Takahashi as establishing that alienage is a
suspect dassification, 39 the Court in Graham concluded that provisions
35. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184,
196 (1964).
36. 394 U.S. at 637-40. See Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, supra note 5, at
1076-77; Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80
HARV. L. REv. 91, 95 (1966).
37. See Note, Aliens-Employment on Public Works-Caifornia's Prohibition Against Con-
tractors Employing Aliens on Public Works Declared Unconstitutional, 11 HARv. INT'L LJ. 228,
236 (1970).
38. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
39. Id. at 372.
But see Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion to Sugarman v. Dougall and In re
Griffiths, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973) (single dissent to two opinions), where he sets forth a
cogent and comprehensive argument tat neither the decided cases nor the philosophy
behind the special protection of the strict standard necessitates that alienage be made a
suspect classification. See also Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, supra note 5, at
1088, 1126-27; Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, .83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 33 (1969); Note, Aliens-Employment on Public Works
1974]
Cornell International Law Journal
of state welfare laws conditioning benefits on citizenship and imposing
durational residency requirements on aliens violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Classifications based on alienage were "inherently" suspect
because aliens as a class constitute a prime example of a "discrete and
insular minority"40 for whom heightened judicial solicitude is appro-
priate.
The Graham decision, however, did not conclusively determine the
status and scope of the proprietary interest rationale. Although the
Supreme Court dealt with this issue, its holding was limited to the
welfare context. Reasoning that aliens contribute to tax revenues on an
equal basis with citizen-residents of the state and have the same armed
services obligations, the Court held that the state's "special public
interest '41 in tax revenues could not support the state's desire to
preserve limited welfare benefits for its own citizens. The Court re-
jected the concept that constitutional rights may be made to depend
upon whether a government benefit is characterized as a privilege or a
right.42 Thus, while rejecting the proprietary interest rationale in the
context of public assistance, the Court left undecided the doctrine's
vitality in other contexts.
43
-California's Prohibition Against Contractors Employing Aliens on Public Works Declared
Unconstitutional, supra note 37, at 236.
40. 403 U.S. at 371-72. Mr. Justice Stone's well-known footnote serves as a basis for
special consideration given minorities unable to find protection in the political process:
[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordi-
narily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). See Hobson v.
Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 507-508 n.198 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson,
408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
The Court's reliance upon Mr. justice Stone's statement which is contained in a
footnote and which arguably should not apply to aliens is criticized by Mr. Justice
Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion to Sugarman v. Dougall and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S.
at 649.
41. See note 10 supra.
42. 403 U.S. at 374. See also Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
The Court placed special emphasis on the language of Shapiro:
"[A] State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs. It
may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures, whether for public assistance,
public education, or any other program. But a State may not accomplish such a
purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens.... The saving of
welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification." 394 U.S. at
633.
403 U.S. at 374-75. Since an alien as well as a citizen is a "person" for equal protection
purposes, this language was recognized as applicable to the present case.
43. The Court held:
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n [citation omitted], however, cast doubt on the
continuing validity of the special public-interest doctrine in all contexts. ...
[Vol. 8: 92
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The applicability of the strict standard of equal protection review
and the status of the proprietary interest rationale in the employment
context were squarely before the Supreme Court in Sugarman v.
Dougall.4 4 At issue in that case was the constitutional validity of section
53 of New York's Civil Service Law, 45 which prohibited the employ-
ment of aliens in the competitive classified civil service.4 6 Applying the
stringent standard of judicial review as required by Graham's recogni-
tion of alienage as a suspect classification, Justice Blackmun examined
the statute in light of the substantiality of New York's interest in
enforcing the restriction and the precision of the limits confining the
discrimination. As a justification for the discrimination existing under
section 53, the state alleged an interest in having a civil service of
undivided loyalty involved in the formulation and execution of gov-
ernment policy. Such loyalty was regarded by the state as necessary
both to protect an employee's freedom of judgment against potential
conflicts of interest and to promote public confidence in its decision-
makers.
Although the Court recognized the state's broad power to define its
political community,4 7 it held that an alien could be refused or dis-
charged from public employment for reasons of noncitizenship only
after a specific determination of the characteristics of the individual
applicant or employee and his qualifications for a particular position. 48
Whatever may be the contemporary vitality of the special public-interest
doctrine in other contexts after Takahashi, we conclude that a State's desire to
preserve limited welfare benefits for its own citizens is inadequate to justify
Pennsylvania's making non-citizens ineligible for public assistance, and Arizona's
restricting benefits to citizens and long-time resident aliens.
403 U.S. at 374.
44. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
45. "Except as herein otherwise provided, no person shall be eligible for appointment
for any position in the competitive class unless he is a citizen of the United States." N.Y.
Civ. SERv. LAv § 53(1) (McKinney 1973).
46. Plaintiffs, resident aliens of the United States and residents of New York, were
discharged from their competitive civil service positions because of their noncitizenship.
They filed a class action challenging the constitutionality of section 53 and sought
damages and declaratory injunctive relief.
47. In defining the State's power to preserve its conception of "political community,"
the Court stated:
And this power and responsibility of the State applies, not only to the
qualifications of voters, but also to persons holding state elective or important
nonelective executive, legislative, and judicial positions, for officers who partici-
pate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad public policy
perform functions that go to the heart of representative government. There, as
udge Lumbard phrased it in his separate concurrence, is "where citizenship
tears some rational relationship to the special demands of the particular
position." 339 F. Supp. at 911.
413 U.S. at 647.
48. Id. at 646-47.
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When examined in light of New York's overall statutory scheme, the
competitive class of section 53 potentially reached across the full range
of employment, from the menial laborer to the policy-maker. The
statute was unnecessarily broad in view of its acknowledged purpose,
and therefore, could not withstand the equal protection attack.
The Sugarman decision also settled the status of the "special public
interest doctrine" as applied to employment.49 Faced with a situation
presenting a clear-cut employment issue, the Sugarman Court summar-
ily rejected any vestiges of the notion that a state could restrict its
resources for the advancement and profit of its citizens. 50 Relying on
the rationale of Graham, Justice Blackmun observed that the special
public interest doctrine was rooted in the concepts of privilege and the
desirability of confining the use of public resources. However, since an
alien's public obligations are generally the same as those of a citizen,
the doctrine cannot justify limiting or denying public employment of
aliens. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's rejection in Sugarman of the
state's proprietary interest in the occupation itself was a final repudia-
tion of a state's right to discriminate against aliens for the purposes of




The impact of Sugarman extends to all forms of state restrictions on
alien employment, even though the case itself involved only a blanket
prohibition against aliens in public employment. While the decision
clearly did not make all restrictions on alien employment unconstitu-
tional, it did establish guidelines within the acknowledged stringent test
of the Equal Protection Clause for determining the validity of dis-
criminatory employment statutes. These guidelines will enable other
courts to determine the validity of all state laws which limit or deny
occupational opportunities on the basis of alienage. 5' The Supremacy
49. See note 10 supra.
50. 413 U.S. at 645-46.
51. The impact of these statutes on the alien is substantial. In 1972 there were
4,422,000 aliens registered in the United States (all aliens residing in the U.S., except
foreign governmental officials and their dependents, representatives to international
organizations, and Mexican agricultural workers registered with the Department of
Justice). U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATEs
1973, at 100 (94th ed.).
Restrictions on public employment alone potentially have great impact on this alien
[Vol. 8: 92
Equal Protection and Alien Employment
Clause rationale, previously adopted in cases holding discriminatory
state statutes unconstitutional, is no longer necessary to buttress the
equal protection attack.
As a broad proposition, Justice Blackmun held that alienage may
now be used as a criterion for denying public employment only after an
"individualized determination" of the relation of legitimate state in-
terests to the requirements of the particular position and the
qualifications of the particular alien applicant or employee.5' Not only
must the state's interest be legitimate, but the classification must b
necessary to safeguard that interest. Discriminatory legislation must be
narrowly confined and precise in its application.53
One may argue that, in practice, a statutory classification based on a
criterion other than alienage should be demanded only when it is
plausible, as well as financially and administratively feasible.54 How-
ever, in light of the rationale of Graham and Sugarman concerning the
obligations of the alien to the state, added expense and inefficiency
55
should not justify the failure to establish alternative classifications.
Thus, when alienage is the basis for a classification, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause places a heavy burden on the state to prove that a more
narrowly defined classification is not administratively feasible. Where
the state has the means to determine on a case-by-case basis the fitness
of an applicant for employment-as through testing, training, charac-
ter investigations, or a sworn oath-a fiat statutory prohibition against
aliens will not withstand strict judicial scrutiny.56 The possibility that
some aliens might be unsuited for employment is no justification for a
ban on the employment of all aliens. Implicit in this reasoning is a
populaiion. There were 1,097,000 state and local government employees in New York in
1972. Id. at 434. State and local government employees throughout the U.S. in 1972
totalled 10,809,000. Id. at 433.
52. 413 U.S. at 646.
53. Id. at 643.
54. See Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, supra note 5, at 1102.
55. In answer to the contention that employing aliens in career civil service positions
would be inefficient because many aliens would leave their positions, necessitating
re-training and re-hiring, the Court concluded:
As we stated in Graham, noting the general identity of an alien's obligations with
those of a citizen, the 'justification of limiting expenses is particularly inappro-
priate and unreasonable when the discriminated class consists of aliens." 403
U.S., at 376.
413 U.S. at 646.
56. In In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), the Connecticut bar required training and
familiarity with Connecticut law, as well as an "attorney's oath" in which the new lawyer
promised to perform his functions faithfully and honestly. To prevent an applicant from
entering the bar solely due to his status as an alien, when procedures were available for a
case-by-case determination of qualifications, was unconstitutional.
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rejection of any remaining belief by the executive or legislative
branches of government in the justification based on alienage-linked
traits.
In addition to narrowing the limits of such statutory discrimination,
the Supreme Court will now review the substantiality of the state's
interest in enforcing the statute. The valid state interests set forth in
Sugarman as being substantial and hence permissible are very narrow.
In recognition of a state's continuing but limited power to establish
classifications based on alienage in public employment statutes, the
Court mentioned only a state's interest in defining its political commu-
nity, and its corresponding interest in establishing the qualifications for
persons involved in the formulation, execution, or review of broad
public policy.
Sugarman's companion case, In re Griffiths,57 provides further in-
sight into the nature of valid state interests .justifying statutory,
employment-related discrimination based on alienage. The Griffiths
case examined the constitutional validity of a state court rule which
denied aliens the right to-take the Connecticut bar examination. 8
While recognizing that a state has a substantial and constitutionally
permissible interest in determining whether an applicant possesses the
character and general fitness required of an attorney, the Supreme
Court held that the state failed to meet its burden of establishing that
the state court rule was necessary to its interest in maintaining high
professional standards. The Court once again stressed the notion-this
time outside the realm of public employment-that the powers and
responsibilities held by the alien would not involve matters of state
policy or acts of unique responsibility that could be entrusted only to
citizens. The Court noted that a lawyer is not an "office holder," 9 and,
57. Id.
58. The Plaintiff was a citizen of the Netherlands and a resident of Connecticut. After
her graduation from law school, she was refused permission to take the Connecticut bar
examination. The County Bar Association found her qualified in all respects except for
the fact that she was not a citizen of the United States as required by Rule 8(1) of the
Connecticut Practice Book (1963). On this basis, the County Bar Association refused to
allow Plaintiff to take the examination.
59. Until as recently as 1958, no state allowed an alien to practice law. Note, Constitu-
tionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, supra note 8, at 1027 nn.108-10. See M.
KONVITZ, supra note 1, at 188. The cases almost unanimously upheld this exclusion.
Among the reasons traditionally supported by legal writers for the exclusion of aliens
from legal practice were: (a) the attorney is an officer of the court and, therefore, should
be a citizen, and (b) the alien cannot take the necessary oath to the Constitution. Note,
Constitutionality of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, supra note 8, at 1027 n.1 10. Both of
these arguments were rejected by the Court in Griffiths. The Court held that although
lawyers have traditionally been leaders of government, a lawyer is not an officer in the
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therefore, held that the state court rule restricting admission to the bar
to citizens of the United States was not supported by a state interest so
compelling as to withstand strict judicial scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.
When read together, Sugarman and Griffiths suggest that, apart from
the exception recognized for the "formulation, execution, and review
of public policy," the only basis for restrictions in the employment of
aliens is the actual character and fitness of the individual without
regard to his or her status as an alien. Thus, since the mere status as an
alien will no longer suffice to justify such discrimination, the Court
seems to indicate that it can imagine only one compelling interest
sufficient to save a statute restricting alien employment-the public
policy exception. The analysis is now limited to determining whether
the statute is sufficiently narrow so as to fall within this permissible
interest. This new standard therefore casts considerable doubt upon
the continued validity of all state statutory restrictions on alien em-
ployment which were previously justified by the special public interest
doctrine or as a valid exercise of police power.6 0 Moreover, it is
ordinary sense. "Nor does the status of holding a license to practice law place one so close
to the core of the political process as to make him a formulator of government policy."
403 U.S. at 729.
As to the requirement of an oath, persons other than citizens can in good conscience
take an oath to support the Constitution, and the state may properly conduct a character
investigation to determine the applicant's true beliefs. Id. at 725-26.
60. For example, under New York statutes, aliens may not be admitted to practice law,
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. RULE 9406 (McKinney 1963); may not teach in public schools unless they
apply to and do become citizens within a specified time, or are employed pursuant to
regulations permitting such employment, N.Y. EDUc. LAw § 3001 (McKinney 1970);
except under certain circumstances, may not obtain temporary teaching certificates for
up to two years, N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 3001-a (McKinney 1970); will be employed on public
works only if citizens are not available, N.Y. LABOR LAW § 222 (McKinney 1965); except
in certain areas of acute shortage of qualified personnel, may not be employed in civil
service in "competitive" classes of jobs, N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAW § 53 (McKinney 1973); alien
employees of private enterprises acquired by the State may only continue in positions
classified as competitive if within one year of classification they file a declaration of
intention to become a citizen, N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 45(1) (McKinney 1973); may not be
gunsmiths or deal in firearms, N.Y. PENAL LAw § 400.00(1) (McKinney 1967); may not
personally, or as a participant in a business, manufacture or sell alcoholic beverages, N.Y.
ALco. BEv. CONTROL LAW § 126(3), (4) (McKinney 1970); may not obtain a license to
practice medicine, or become a licensed chiropractor, dentist, dental hygienist, vet-
erinarian, pharmacist, or certified shorthand reporter, or licensed masseur, without
becoming a citizen or filing a declaration of intention to become a citizen in accordance
with the commissioner's regulations, N.Y. EDUC. LAw §§ 6524, 6554, 6604, 6609, 6704,
7324, 7502, 7804 (McKinney 1970).
Twenty-two states have conditions for employment on public work projects which deny
or restrict employment of aliens. Comment, Equal Protection and Supremacy Clause Limita-
tions on State Legislation Restricting Aliens, supra note 1, at 141 n.25. See Note, Constitutional-
ity of Restrictions on Aliens' Right to Work, supra note & See generally M. KoNvrrz, supra note
1; 5 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAws 295 (1938); Chamberlain, Aliens and the Right to
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interesting to note that this test is more stringent than that required by
international standards. 61
After reaching the conclusion in Sugarman that the state statute
violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee, the
Supreme Court determined that it was unnecessary to reach the issue
of whether the citizenship requirement was in conflict with the com-
prehensive regulation of immigration and naturalization by the
Congress. 62 Thus, it is no longer necessary to regard the Equal Protec-
tion Clause as merely a supplemental or alternative standard against
which to test the constitutional validity of statutes discriminating
against aliens. A state now stands forewarned that ingenuity in struc-
turing a narrow restriction or a change in the federal naturalization
and immigration scheme will not shield a statute from constitutional
attack. 63 The possibility that narrower statutory restrictions might not
invade the exclusive federal power of Congress and could be supported
by the state's interest in preserving the local labor market is no longer a
viable alternative. All restrictions on the employment of aliens will be
subject to equal protection attack under the strict standard of judicial
review and will be upheld only to the extent justified by the state's
compelling interest in the "formulation, execution and review of public
policy."
CONCLUSION
The recognition of alienage as a suspect classification essentially
requires that aliens be treated as citizens.6 4 The permissive standard of
Work, 18 A.B.A.J. 379 (1932); Note, Constitutionality of Legislative Discrimination Against the
Alien in his Right to Work, 83 U. PA. L. REv. 74, 76 n.9 (1934).
The Supreme Court in Sugarman did not express a view as to whether federal
citizenship requirements for federal service are susceptible to constitutional challenge.
413 U.S. at 646 n.12. SeeJail v. Hampton, 460 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 887 (1972); Note, Aliens and the Civil Service: A Closed Door?, 61 Gzo. L.J. 207 (1972).
61. International standards impose only a test of reasonableness u pon alien restric-
tions. Restrictions upon the economic opportunities of aliens in order to promote a
legitimate national interest are not unusual and the exclusion of aliens from public works
employment is accepted. Note, Aliens-Employment on Public Works-California's Prohibition
Against Contractors Employing Aliens on Public Works Declared Unconstitutional, supra note 37,
at 233 nn.27 & 28, 235 n.32.
62. 413 U.S. at 646.
63. See Note, Aliens-Employment on Public Works-California's Prohibition Against Con-
tractors Employing Aliens on Public Works Declared Unconstitutional, supra Note 37, at 235.
64. The Constitution itself recognizes a basic difference between citizens and aliens in
at least 10 important areas: representatives and senators must be citizens, U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 2, c. 2 & 3; Congressional authority "to establish a uniform Rule of Naturaliza-
tion," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 4;judicial authority of the federal courts extends to suits
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equal protection review was never capable of offering such extensive
protection. The Supreme Court's analysis in Sugarman implies that the
scope of state interests offered as justifications for statutes denying or
limiting occupational opportunities available to aliens must be very
narrow to withstand strict judicial scrutiny.65 The justification based
solely on alienage-linked traits is implicitly rejected and a case-by-case
determination of the fitness of an applicant for employment is now
required wherever possible. Arguably, the "formulation, execution,
and review of public policy" standard arising out of Sugarman and
Griffiths suffers from the vice of inhibiting future analysis. 66 However,
in light of the alien's obligations to the state and his lack of political
impress at the polls, 67 it is difficult to differ with the policy implicit in
the Supreme Court's statement of the law.
Stephan C. Rosen
involving citizens of the United States "and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects," U.S.
CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 5; the Eleventh Amendment; the relevance of the Fifteenth,
Nineteenth, Twenty-Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments only to citizens; require-
ment that the President must be a "natural born citizen," U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. All
of these distinctions, however, except U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 5, come within the
"formulation, execution, and review of policy" rubric. See Mr. Justice Rehnquist's dissent
in Sugarman v. Dougall and In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 649.
65. On the authority of Sugarman, the Court of Appeals affirmed a summary judg-
ment of the District Court which held that a civil service rule excluding aliens from
employment was unconstitutional. Mendoza v. Miami, 483 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1973).
66. For instance, in his dissenting opinion in Sugarman and Griffiths, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist suggests several additional justifications for limiting alien employment: (1) the
de facto decision-making or policy-making authority in the hands of employees not
generally considered to he in legislative or high-level administrative positions; (2) the
need for familiarity with political and social values necessary for efficient government;
and (3) an understanding of the American political and social experience required of
those having some authority to alter social relationships and institutions of our society
through the judicial process. 413 U.S. at 661-64.
67. One commentator has suggested that the lack of suffrage for residents of the
District of Columbia impelled the rigorous judicial review of the regulatory scheme
involved in Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See Developments in the Law: Equal Protection, supra
note 5, at 1126 n.278.
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